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1. Introduction
Interest in the relationship between growth andequity has deep roots and a long history in
economic thinking and development debates.
Traditionally, thinking has been divided between
those who favour focusing on efficiency and
growth as the best way to overcome poverty
and inequality and those who advocate explicit
policies to assist the poor even if this might come
at the expense of a slower overall growth rate
(Bourguignon, 2000: 2). In recent years, however,
thinking has evolved beyond such a presumed
trade-off with calls for a better understanding of
the relationship between growth and distribution.  
Recent developments in Africa and Asia have
contributed to this re-think.  For instance, the
“African Renaissance” of the last decade with
growth rates averaging 6% per annum during
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Key messages
• This paper shows that the longstanding relationship between growth and distribution in economics has 
been revived in recent years with greater focus on inclusive growth as growth that is capable of 
benefiting much larger sections of the society.
• The  extensive descriptive review of a broad set of development indicators for the past two decades and 
an estimation of a combined single score for measuring ‘inclusive growth’ for individual countries has 
shown that overall North Africa has fared relatively better recently both in historical terms and compared 
to many other regions.
• Moreover, the same decade saw a raft of other encouraging achievements: life expectancy rose, 
educational and health indicators improved, the number and proportion of slum dwellers declined and 
more people enjoyed civic amenities such as access to improved drinking water and sanitation.
• The main area where the region has noticeably lagged behind the rest of the world in recent years is its 
demographic momentum. Taking population size and growth into account qualifies some of the positive 
economic achievements of the region in the past decade. GDP growth in per capita terms appears 
much more modest. Strong supply-side demographic pressures will no doubt continue to persist for 
years and will accentuate the challenge of achieving inclusive growth in North Africa.
• This leads us to conclude that no matter what notion of inclusive growth we adopt, for the region, 
generating high quality employment will be an essential element and will pose one of main challenges 
to prospects for achieving inclusive growth. This wasalso clearly borne out by our estimations of the IG 
score and the sensitivity analysis which underscored yet again the importance of employment indicators 
in the region.
2001-08 has failed to create a significant reduction in poverty with
inequality rising both between and within countries (JICA, 2012: 6).
Asia’s experience of rapid and sustained growth, on the other hand,
has demonstrated that considerable poverty reduction is indeed
possible in the face of persistent, and widening, inequalities. This has
in turn led to a sharper differentiation between policies dedicated to
fighting poverty and those aiming to improve equality, and more
generally, to greater interest in making growth more ‘inclusive’ to
benefit the widest social and economic groupings. Significantly,
inclusive growth now features as one of the main pillars in the strategic
priorities of both the Asian Development Bank (Strategy 2020) and
African Development Bank (2013-22; see ADB, 2008, and AfDB,
2013).
Recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
region too have raised similar issues relating to the nature and type
of growth experienced in the region. The outbreak of mass protests
against authoritarian regimes – dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’ – has shown
how a narrow focus on growth and a failure to consider its wider
ramifications can have far-reaching consequences. These uprisings
in the main occurred against a somewhat paradoxical background
of a period of relatively improved economic performance in the region.
During 2000-10, for instance, MENA’s real GDP growth averaged
around 4%-5% a year (Hakimian, 2011) including Tunisia, Libya,
Yemen and Egypt, where autocratic regimes were swept away by
mass revolts after 2010. Yet, the region continued to suffer from social
and economic disparities with persistently high unemployment,
particularly amongst the youth. A trickle-down mechanism to spread
the benefits of growth was either absent or not sufficiently robust to
stem social and political unrest. An overriding economic lesson of
the decade before these uprisings is therefore that it is not growth
per se but the type and pattern of growth achieved that matters 
as well.
As the new administrations in the region begin the daunting task of
charting their future, their ability to combine an acceleration of growth
with a marked reduction of inequality and poverty remains a real
challenge. Achieving a more inclusive growth for the benefit of wider
sections of the society will be an important mark of differentiation between
the future and the past or else they risk considerable and continued
disillusionment and discontent.
This paper considers North Africa’s recent trajectory of growth and
considers critically its prospects for achieving inclusive growth in light
of the recent political and social upheavals. We start first by reviewing
the evolution of thinking on growth and distribution in economic theory
and development policy showing how pro-poor growth strategies have
given way to concerns about inequality in recent years (Section 2). In
Section 3, we examine the concept of inclusive growth examining
whether and to what extent it differs from pro-poor growth both
analytically and in practice. Section 4 deals with a wide range of
performance indicators pertaining to growth and distribution in Algeria,
Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. We analyse, where possible, the
experience of these countries over time and in a comparative context
with other developing regions.  Section 5 then offers a methodology for
constructing a single combined score for measuring inclusive growth
in these and a number of other Less Developed Countries for comparison
purposes. We end by critically re-examining prospects for inclusive
growth in North Africa and challenges and opportunities this course of
development strategy may entail in years to come.
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2. From Growth and Equity, to Poverty Reduction, and Back? 
Concerns about growth and inequality go back a long way ineconomic thinking and policy debates.  Early post-war thinking
on the subject was influenced by Kuznets’ seminal work in 1955
which posited an ‘Inverted-U Hypothesis’ between growth and income
distribution (Kuznets, 1955). Accordingly, growth was initially expected
to have a detrimental effect on inequality but this was eventually to
be reversed during the course of long-term economic growth. 
This influential view was to a large extent rooted in development
thinking at the time which saw structural transformation and growth
making differential impacts on different sectors and regions.
Accordingly, given that some sectors and regions were likely to benefit
more first, inequality was expected to worsen initially.  However, with
the benefits of growth and transformation spreading to more sectors
and regions, the rising trend of inequality would be expected to be
reversed and equality would improve.  More specifically, this process
was driven by shifts in surplus labour from the poorer and less
productive traditional (or subsistence) sector to the more productive
(or capitalist) sector. As the weight of the sector with greater inequality
(modern sector) rises and simultaneously the gap between the two
sectors widens, overall inequality would deteriorate at first (McKinley,
2009:12). With inequality eventually stabilising, the impact of growth
on equality would thus show up as an inverted-U shape. 
While Kuznets’ empirical work was based on the historical experience
of three developed countries only (the USA, England and Germany), his
influence was nevertheless pervasive enough to elevate his contribution
to something of an ‘iron law’ in the course of growth and development.
This was despite the fact that subsequent empirical investigations failed
to give a conclusive support in favour of the inverted-U hypothesis.
While Barro found empirical support for it in two successive studies
(2000 and 2008), other studies cast a shadow of doubt on the empirical
validity of this hypothesis. For instance, some studies have pointed out
to differences in Asia where rapid periods of growth (such as in Korea
and Taiwan between the 1970s and 1990s) were not accompanied 
with deteriorating income inequality (Ali, 2007a: 8).  Similarly, based on
a comprehensive study of the Gini index with some 682 observations
for 108 countries, Deininger and Squire (1996) failed to find empirical
support for Kuznets’ inverted-U curve. 
Empirical ambiguities aside, the wider policy implications of such a
simple, and yet powerful, hypothesis were perhaps more important.
At one level, the Kuznets curve seemed to imply that a degree of
deterioration in inequality was inevitable at least in early stages of
growth and structural transformation. On the other hand, this
pessimistic and short term outlook was countered by optimism in the
long run since growth would eventually pave the way for an
improvement in income distribution.  What delineated the two phases
was a ‘trickle down’ mechanism or process which would ultimately
kick in, spreading out the benefits of growth.  This influential view –
placing efficiency and growth before distribution – became dominant
during the 1960s as well as during the structural adjustment reforms
of the 1980s and early 1990s (Bourguignon, 2000: 3).  
The 1970s, however, saw a major rethinking of the subject. This was
led by another seminal work in 1974 – Redistribution with Growth –
which sought to reposition equity at the heart of the development agenda
(Chenery et al, 1974). Questioning the primacy of growth over distribution,
the authors argued that, given the weight of the rich in GNP, a strategy
of maximising growth was bound to be inherently pro-rich. It was
therefore no surprise that the policies adopted to maximise growth
entailed in the main a range of market- and business-friendly policies
(such as lower income and corporate taxes, wage-restraint and low
inflation policies), which have since become the norm though they have
at the same time been adorned as ‘pro-poor’ in their impact (McKinley,
2009: 15).  From this perspective, however, what was advocated was
not so much a redistribution of assets in favour of the poor as the
reallocation of public investment to bring about a more just distribution
of resources over time (McKinley, 2009: 16).
While the influence of this book was largely limited and its main message
drowned in the global economic crisis that followed the first oil shock
in the mid-1970s, debates had moved on and poverty was gradually
moving centre stage of the development agenda. This paved the way
for a more explicit formulation of the case for fighting poverty through
‘pro-poor’ policies. This in turn required a more holistic and strategic
framework to address the inter-relationships between growth, inequality
and poverty – beyond the simple growth-distribution trade-off – and
the attraction of ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ (PPG) policies was in the fact that
they seemed ‘to satisfy both growth enthusiasts and equity advocates
by bringing both objectives into a common analytical framework and
value system’ (McKinley, 2009: 3).
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At a very general level, it was relatively easy to agree over the broad
steer for pro-poor policies as those policies that are ‘good for the poor’.
Agreement over the definition of the poor was, however, more challenging
given two alternative approaches. If poverty was identified in absolute
terms (such as a simple headcount of those below an international
poverty benchmark such as $1.25 or $2 a day), then PPG policies could
be measured simply by their impact on the poor irrespective of what
happened to the income of the rest of the population (those above the
benchmark). In this case, both the extent of poverty (the proportion of
the people below the poverty line) and its depth (how far most poor
people were below that line) depended merely on the rate of growth of
income for the poor alone. For instance, for two countries starting with
the same benchmarked poverty ratio, the one enjoying a higher rate of
income growth for its poor would be more successful in reducing the
incidence of poverty (its extent and/or its depth) compared to the other
country where its poor experience a slower income growth rate.
A different situation arises, however, if poverty is defined in relative terms,
such as in relation to a national poverty line (for instance as a proportion
of national mean or median income). In this case, for growth to be ‘pro-
poor’ the growth of income for the poor has to exceed the rate of growth
for the income of the population as a whole (DFID, 2004). A corollary
of this is, therefore that for growth to be pro-poor, income inequality as
a whole must fall regardless of how the income of those below the
absolute poverty line fares. 
The distinction between absolute and relative notions and measurements
of poverty can lead to two anomalies.  First, it is easy to conceive of
the fight against poverty succeeding in absolute terms while income
distribution as a whole deteriorates (the rich get richer faster than the
incomes of the poor improve). Second, the converse is also possible:
income distribution may improve while poverty actually deteriorates (for
instance during a recession, if the poor suffer less compared to the
average contraction in incomes).
These two different approaches to the notion and measurement of
poverty lay at the heart of the debate between Ravallion and Kakwani
whose seminal works focused on relative and absolute poverty
respectively (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000, and Kakwani et al, 2004;
Ravallion and Chen, 2003, and Ravallion, 2004).  Kakwani, who was
more concerned with the distributional consequences of growth,
envisaged “pro-poor growth” as being the type of growth that would
reduce poverty more than it would if all incomes grew at the same rate
(Kakwani and Pernia, 2000).  Ravallion, by contrast, focused on poverty
itself, simply defining “pro-poor growth” as growth that reduces poverty.
He also went as far as arguing that rapid growth is pro-poor because
it is poverty-reducing (Ravallion, 2004). This was seen, for instance, in
the case of China which has managed to reduce extreme poverty through
rapid growth. 
While interest in pro-poor growth strategies had its obvious attractions
for those concerned with poverty eradication, targeting absolute poverty
was both easier and more practical from a policy point of view.  This is,
for instance, reflected in the Millennium Development Goal of halving
income poverty by 2015 (DFID, 2004). In more recent years, however,
PPG has given way to a broader interest in growth that is more inclusive
in character and not limited to just the conditions and welfare of the
poor. 
An important impetus behind this gradual shift of opinion came from a
stark reminder that achieving growth and a substantial reduction in
poverty were indeed compatible with worsening income equality. As
mentioned before, this was exemplified in Asia’s experience in the past
two decades, where impressive growth rates have been combined with
a notable decline in poverty alongside rising income inequalities.  It has
been estimated that every 1% growth in Asia has been associated with
an almost 2% reduction in poverty, yet at the same time, data also
indicate that income inequality has increased over time (Ali, 2007a: 2).
Rapid growth between 1990 and 2005, for instance, pushed the number
of those below the $1-a-day poverty line down to 604 million from 945
million (almost halving the headcount ratio from 35% to 18%). Similarly,
the number of those below the $2-a-day poverty benchmark shrank
from 2,046 million to 1,740 million reducing the headcount ratio from
75% to 52% of the total (Ali, 2007a: 2-3; see also Ali, 2007b on the
extent of poverty incidence in Asia).  
Much of this decline was attributed to rapid growth in China and Vietnam
(in South Asia, in fact, poverty incidence remains high).  Nevertheless,
this experience shows that the pattern and pace of growth is indeed
critical to poverty reduction, and moreover, reducing inequality and
ensuring a more even and equal spread of the benefits of growth requires
more than a narrow agenda to maximise growth.  This was quite clear
in the Asian context, where according to various indicators growth had
an uneven impact on different groups. For instance, the Gini coefficient
deteriorated in almost all countries (with the exception of Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand, which were severely hit by the Asian financial
crisis). Similarly, household expenditure surveys have shown widening
gaps with the growth in per capita expenditure of the top quintile far
exceeding that of the bottom quintile. In China this ratio was as high as
2.5, in India 3 and in Bangladesh a staggering 25 (Ali, 2007a: 5). 
By the mid-2000s, therefore, there was a growing and widespread
concern that growth had to be made inclusive to ensure a more equitable
spread of its benefits to the widest population possible. For instance,
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equity featured high on the agenda during the Indian national election
in 2004, as well as subsequently, when the new government built
concrete strategies into India’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-12) to
safeguard and promote the well-being of the poor and disadvantaged
groups (Government of India, 2006; see also Klasen, 2010). Similarly,
the World Bank’s World Development Report in 2006 was devoted to
‘Equity and Development’, addressing the intrinsic value of equity and
focusing on its positive impact on long term development (see also
Ianchovichina et al, 2009).  
Reflecting Asia’s centrality to concerns about equity, the Asian
Development Bank took the lead role in articulating the need for inclusive
growth, going as far as adopting it as one of its ‘strategic pillars’. This
was formalised in ADB’s Strategy 2020 which lists inclusive growth as
the first of its three key development agenda (the other two being
environmentally sustainable growth and regional integration; ADB, 2008).
Such commitment was also reflected in advice given by the Eminent
Persons Group, which was set up to develop ADB’s strategy for inclusive
growth. Reflecting on the potentially harmful impact of rising disparities
on economic reforms or even on political stability, the Group favoured
a solution based on “...the continuation of pro-growth economic
strategies – but with a much sharper focus on ensuring that the economic
opportunities created by growth are available to all – particularly the
poor – to the maximum extent possible” (ADB, 2007: 13–14). 
Reflecting growing interest in, and concerns with prospects for equitable
growth, the African Development Bank (AfDB) too has recently adopted
‘inclusive growth’ as one of its two strategic priorities for 2013-22 to
broaden access ‘to economic opportunities for more people, countries
and regions, while protecting the vulnerable’ (the other strategic priority
being green growth ‘to make growth sustainable’). In this approach,
inclusive growth is conceptualised in terms of its four dimensions:
economic inclusion, social inclusion, spatial inclusion and political
inclusion (see AfDB, 2013: 10).
This interest has led to wider debates and a flurry of new contributions
and literature dealing with many aspects ranging from the conceptual
and analytical complexities of inclusive growth to its measurement
difficulties and applications to specific country experiences.  
The next section discusses the meaning and significance of inclusive
growth and examines its broader implications for growth and
development before turning to an examination of its ramifications in
North Africa in Section 4.
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3. What is Inclusive Growth? 
Although growth is widely considered a necessary element in acountry’s ability to raise the standard of living of its population,
it is recognised that growth alone cannot be relied upon to bring
about a reduction in poverty or a desired improvement in the welfare
of all. As we have seen, the quality of such growth, its sustainability
as well as the degree to which its benefits may extend to the widest
sections of the society have increasingly become of interest. This has
led to greater attention being given to inclusive growth as a way of
addressing equity considerations underlying the growth process in
recent years (see Tandon and Zhuang, 2007; Ali, 2007a and 2007b;
Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010; Klasen, 2010; and Felipe, 2010;
Ianchovichina et al, 2009, among others).
Concern about equity has had two main intellectual drivers.  First,
those who believe in an intrinsic value of equality view it as a matter
of human rights and consider its violation as unethical or immoral. In
this view, equity should form an integral part of the development
agenda to ensure it is not sacrificed to higher growth and efficiency
concerns. Second, greater equality is also deemed by some to have
an instrumental value for long term and sustainable growth. From this
perspective, inequality poses a risk to growth in a number of ways.
For instance, ‘it leads to inefficient utilization of human and physical
resources, lowers the quality of institutions and policies, erodes social
cohesion, and increases social conflict’ (Ali, 2007b: 10). 
Despite growing calls for growth to be made more inclusive, however,
there is not yet a universally agreed definition of ‘inclusive growth’.
While growth is easier to define and measure, specifying what makes
it ‘inclusive’ is much more contentious. There is some broad
agreement that inclusive growth is growth for ‘the benefit of most
and not just the poor’, but ambiguities and disagreements abound
beyond this general notion and it seems that this approach too has
encountered some of the conceptual and measurement challenges
that the Pro-Poor-Growth debates confronted previously. 
Taking a somewhat narrow approach, for instance, inclusive growth
can be characterised as ‘growth plus declining income disparities’
(Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010). In this formulation, inclusive growth
comes close to the notion of PPG in relative terms with the difference
perhaps that its notion of equality is more embracing and reaches
beyond a narrow definition of the poor.  This definition, it must be
noted, excludes non-income considerations and, therefore, lends
itself much more easily to measurement (Klasen, 2010: 5).  
By contrast and at another extreme, inclusive growth is also sometimes
loosely referred to as ‘growth that benefits everyone’. In this – perhaps
its broadest sense – the concept seems to imply that growth should
‘benefit all stripes of society, including the poor, the near-poor, the
middle income groups, and even the rich’ (Klasen, 2010: 2).  But this
is equally problematic and highlights the fact that it is not just who is
to benefit from growth but the extent and distribution of such benefits
are important considerations and should not be overlooked. 
If income distribution is to improve and inequalities are to be reduced
(a presumed aspiration behind the search for inclusive growth), then
the poor and the rich should not be expected to benefit proportionately
from growth (by an equal percentage rise in their incomes). Narrowing
disparities would indeed require a progressive distribution of the
benefits from growth in favour of the poorer sections of the society.
From this perspective then inclusive growth comes close to the relative
version of PPG with the difference that the definition of the ‘poor’
needs to be widened to allow broader social groups (lower and middle
income groups) to benefit from growth. We shall come back to this
later on. 
Both the narrow and broad definitions referred to above face some
complications. For instance, both are focused on income and
emphasise outcomes only.  More recent formulations have sought to
address these by taking into account non-income elements of the
growth process as well as characterising inclusive growth as a process
and not just an outcome (Klasen, 2010).
For instance, some recent contributions have stressed the role of
opportunities in generating inclusive growth.  This is the case with
the ADB’s Eminent Persons Group which – as we saw earlier – refers
to inclusive growth as ‘economic opportunities’ that are ‘available to
all – particularly the poor – to the maximum possible extent’ (ADB,
2007: 13-14; emphasis added). Several other ADB contributions have
similarly characterised inclusive growth as ‘growth coupled with equal
opportunities’ (Ali and Zhuang, 2007; Ali and Son 2007) or even more
specifically, ‘inclusive growth focuses on both creating opportunities
and making the opportunities accessible to all’ (Ali and Zhuang, 2007:
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10). Accordingly, this depicts inclusive growth as a process – rather
than an outcome – whereby individuals are provided with improved
opportunities to benefit from growth. 
There is, however, some ambiguity over the precise role of the state
in the inclusive growth process. For instance, are market forces to
be relied upon to spread the benefits of inclusive growth (through
improved opportunities for all) or is state intervention justified to enable
individuals to improve their outcomes? The former approach, which
is arguably a ‘trickle down’ version of the inclusive growth approach,
is seen in the World Bank’s 2006 Development Report on ‘Equity
and Development’, which defines equity broadly as ‘equal
opportunities to pursue a life of one’s choosing.’  In a similar light,
Ianchovichina et al emphasise that inclusive growth is about ‘raising
the pace of growth and enlarging the size of the economy’ and not
about ‘redistributing resources’ (2009: 3). 
For others, however, the provision of public and social goods as well
as safety nets and social protection are also important elements of the
inclusive growth package.  Accordingly, Ali and Son (2007) refer to the
provision of social opportunities (such as access to health and education)
and how these may vary with income levels.  Similarly, the World Bank’s
Commission on Growth and Development talked of inclusiveness as a
concept encompassing ‘equity, equality of opportunity, and protection
in market and employment’ (World Bank, 2008).
Matching this desire to improve opportunities, attention has inevitably
been drawn to understanding and recognising the roots of unequal
opportunities.  Roemer (2006) ascribes differences in outcomes (such
as income differentials for individuals) to two broad sets of factors:
differences in individual efforts (which can be controlled by individuals
themselves) and differences in their circumstances (which cannot be
helped by them alone). The latter – differences in circumstances –
may in turn be understood at two sub-levels: individual-level
circumstances (e.g., gender, size of household, one’s parental
education and income, rural/urban and regional location, ethnic and
religious backgrounds, etc) and wider circumstances relating to
institutional setting and social policies in force (such as gender or
ethic discrimination, social exclusions, etc). As individuals cannot
exert any direct influence over their circumstances, such differences
are ‘not only ethically unacceptable’, they are indeed wasteful and
should be ‘addressed through public policy interventions’ (Ali, 2007a:
9; Velez et al, 2012, offer an applied framework for measuring equality
of opportunity for children in Egypt). 
In this formulation, therefore, inclusive growth can improve individuals’
incentives to work harder and to look for new opportunities mainly
through their own efforts. What is required to achieve inclusive growth
is accordingly a double process: one of creating better opportunities
and another of ‘ensuring equal access’ to these opportunities for all
segments of the society (Ali, 2007a, 10). 
Focus on process helps to broaden the scope of the debate to include
social and institutional aspects of growth and development.  But it
also throws up new challenges. One of these is how to deal with a
trade-off between processes and outcomes. Is growth more – or less
– inclusive when improved processes result in poorer economic
outcomes? This can happen, for instance, when improvements in
civil rights and greater mass participation in social and political affairs
(such as following a revolution) may lead to a setback to economic
outcomes through short-term instability and turmoil.  A converse
scenario is equally conceivable: if better outcomes are secured in the
absence of any commensurate improvements in process, does that
make the experience of growth undesirable? This can happen, for
instance, with an economic boom under an autocratic regime in the
absence of any real reforms or improvements in governance.  
Such issues could be better addressed if we had a commonly agreed
indicator for measuring inclusive growth (see McKinley, 2010). But,
the conceptual difficulties and challenges we discussed above are
inevitably mirrored in measurement difficulties and problems, too. If
the benefits of growth are envisaged in terms of outcomes only (for
instance, in terms of better income and/or access to social goods
and safety net), measurement is generally easier given that such
outcomes are more readily quantifiable. However, when access to
and benefits from growth are envisaged in terms of processes,
measurement becomes harder and more complex. According to
Klasen (2010) the absence of a universally agreed notion of inclusive
growth has led to a wide range of measurement indicators which vary
from ‘unclear’ to ‘straightforward’ and ‘technically difficult’.  We take
up this issue in Section 5 below when we offer a methodology for
computing a single combined score for the measurement of a
country’s inclusive growth. 
To sum up this section, we can see that growing interest in inclusive
growth has not been matched by success over a universal definition
that can help both implement and monitor policies for inclusive growth.
A variety of approaches have emerged with emphases on different
aspects of the concept.  Narrower concepts stress outcomes (e.g.,
growth plus equity) and are easier to measure and monitor. Wider
concepts are multi-dimensional and hence more ambitious in scope:
they stress improved opportunities for achieving better outcomes;
they differentiate between processes and outcomes in inclusive growth
and they widen outcomes to include non-income aspects (social
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goods and safety nets). An implicit risk is that an overambitious notion
of inclusive growth becomes both meaningless and impractical if it
comes close to advocating ‘everything for everyone’. 
In the next section, we deal with some of the main economic and
social indicators in North Africa over the past two decades. We will
examine whether and to what extent the experience of growth in this
period has been inclusive from a broad macro perspective. We will
provide comparisons with other regions and focus on the main
economic outcomes and opportunities by examining a variety of
different indicators relating to growth and transformation on one hand
and access to social and public goods, on the other.
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4. Inclusive Growth in North Africa 
4.1 Growth and Structural Change
North African countries’ recent economic performance indicatesa much improved record compared to the 1980s, when ‘slow
growth’ posed a threat ‘to social development’ in the Arab world as
a whole. For instance, GDP per capita in the median Arab country in
the period 1985-94 was as low as 1.1% per annum only (Elbadawi,
2005; see also Esfahani, 2009). In contrast, real GDP growth rate for
the Arab countries and the MENA region as a whole rose markedly
after the mid-1990s to reach around 4%-4.5% per annum and was
sustained thereafter (Table 1).  
North Africa’s average real GDP growth was even higher. In the last
decade preceding the Arab uprisings (2000-2010), Egypt, Libya,
Morocco and Tunisia all experienced annual growth rates of between
4.4% and 4.9% with only Algeria recording a lower growth (3.7%).
In comparative terms, too, North African growth rates in this period
compared favourably with most other regions. For instance, they
surpassed those of East Asia (3.7%) and Latin America (3.4%) and
were just above that for the MENA region as a whole (4.3%). However,
they fell marginally behind Sub-Saharan Africa (4.8%) and well short
of South Asia (exceeding 7%).  
This picture is somewhat moderated if we take into account the high
population growth rates in the in the Arab world in general although
the improved trend-line performance since the mid-1990s is still clear.
This is especially true of Algeria and Libya, where a fast demographic
pace scaled down real per capita growth rates to just over 2% per
annum in the past decade, which is on par with the rest of the MENA
region. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, on the other hand, experienced
superior per capita real growth rates of 2.8%-3.5% in the same period.
In comparative terms, the overall performance of North Africa is at
least comparable to, if not above, other regions’ (for instance,
compared to East Asia’s 2.9% per capita growth rate) and is again
outpaced only by South Asia’s 5.5% per capita annual growth rates.
Interestingly, and as mentioned before, this generally better record
of economic performance during the period 2000-10 applies also for
those countries that have been affected by political upheavals since
Real GDP growth (average annual %)
Real GDP per capita growth (average annual
%)
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001- 2005 2006-2010 2000-2010 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001- 2005 2006-2010 2000-2010
Algeria 0.3 3.1 4.9 2.5 3.7 -1.9 1.6 3.4 1.0 2.2
Egypt 3.4 5.2 3.5 6.2 4.9 1.6 3.4 1.6 4.3 3.0
Libya 3.7 4.3 4.5 4.4 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.3
Morocco 1.1 4.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 -0.6 2.5 3.8 3.8 2.8
Tunisia 3.9 5.6 4.4 4.6 4.5 2.0 4.2 3.4 3.6 3.5
Arab World 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.4 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1
MENA* 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.3 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2
East Asia & Pacific* 3.5 2.7 3.5 3.9 3.7 2.2 1.6 2.7 3.2 2.9
Latin America & Caribbean* 3.3 3.2 2.7 4.1 3.4 1.6 1.6 1.3 2.9 2.1
South Asia 5.0 5.4 6.5 7.7 7.1 2.9 3.5 4.9 6.2 5.5
Sub-Saharan Africa* 1.2 3.5 4.6 5.0 4.8 -1.5 0.8 2.1 2.4 2.2
World 2.3 3.4 2.8 2.3 2.5 0.8 2.0 1.5 1.1 1.3
Note: *Refers to countries at all income levels. 
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012).
Table 1: Real GDP and Real GDP Per Capita Growth Rates in North Africa & Other Regions 
(1991-2010)
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2010. For instance, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia (and Syria) all exhibited real
growth rates of about 4.5% in the decade before these upheavals
(averaging around 4.5%) and did sometimes even better (Egypt’s
growth rate for 2006-10 was 6.2% on average; Table 1; see also
Hakimian, 2011). 
To understand the nature of growth and structural change in this
period, Table 2 shows sectoral growth rates for Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco and Tunisia (Libya is excluded for lack of data) since the
1990s.  It can be seen that in general the service sector has provided
the main impetus to the recent growth phase in North Africa.  In
Algeria and Tunisia, service sector’s growth rate has in fact exceeded
those of both agriculture and manufacturing. In Egypt, manufacturing
growth has also been fast. Only in Morocco has agricultural growth
consistently outpaced the other two sectors.  
We shall come back to this issue later when considering the
contribution of these sectors to employment and job creation.
4.2 Demographic Trends and Characteristics
Tables 3 and 4 give an overview of the demographic changes and
dynamics in North African countries compared to the rest of the world.
It can be seen that the region as a whole has benefited from
improvements in life expectancy combined with a sustained decline
in infant mortality rates. The decline in the under-5 mortality rates has
been particularly marked: by 2009 these rates were about one-third
of those seen twenty years earlier (the only exception being Algeria,
where it almost halved).  Tunisia and Libya, in particular, have attained
the lowest infant mortality rates in the region (16.1 and 16.9 per 1,000
respectively), although the pace of decline was fastest in Egypt (down
from 93.5 to 21.8 per 1,000). 
North Africa’s decline in infant mortality is also faster than the MENA
region as a whole (where it more than halved from 71 to 31 per 1,000)
and compares favourably with other parts of the world. Tunisia, Egypt
and Libya have rates well below the world standards including that
of East Asia’s (23 per 1,000). This is also true of life expectancy at
birth with Libya and Tunisia achieving standards above MENA and
other regions including East Asia (both at 74.5 years against the
latter’s 73).
Agriculture Industry Services
1991-
1995
1996-
2000
2001-
2005
2006-
2009
2001-
2009
1991-
1995
1996-
2000
2001-
2005
2006-
2009
2001-
2009
1991-
1995
1996-
2000
2001-
2005
2006-
2009
2001-
2009
Algeria 4.5 3.9 7.3 1.6 4.8 -0.5 4.0 4.1 1.6 3.0 1.0 2.2 5.1 5.4 5.2
Egypt 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 6.9 5.1 3.0 7.5 5.3 1.6 5.7 4.3 6.1 5.2
Morocco - 10.6 7.7 9.3 8.5 2.1 3.7 4.1 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.6 5.1 4.3 4.7
Tunisia - 8.9 2.2 1.2 1.7 4.4 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.1 4.9 6.0 6.5 6.3 6.4
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012).
Table 2: Average Real Annual Sectoral Growth in North Africa, 1991-2009 (%)
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Table 3 also confirms that after a significant delay, the region’s
demographic transition has started in this period. A marked reduction
in fertility rates occurred between 1990 and 2009, when births per
woman went down from 3.6-4.7 to 2.1-2.8. These rates are now on
par with South Asia (2.8 births per woman) and below that for the Arab
world in general (3.3 births per woman). Again, Tunisia has the lowest
fertility rate in the region (2.1 births per woman) which is closer to that
for East Asia (1.8).
Life Expectancy at Birth,
Total (years)
Mortality rate, under-5
(per 1,000)
Fertility Rate, Total
(births per woman)
1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2009
Algeria 67.1 70.0 72.6 67.6 48.9 36.0 4.7 2.6 2.3
Egypt 62.7 69.1 72.7 93.5 46.5 21.8 4.4 3.3 2.8
Libya 68.1 72.5 74.5 44.5 27.2 16.9 4.8 3.1 2.6
Morocco 64.1 68.7 71.6 85.9 55.3 35.5 4.0 2.7 2.3
Tunisia 70.3 72.6 74.5 49.3 28.4 16.1 3.6 2.1 2.1
Arab World 63.2 67.4 69.9 84.9 64.1 51.4 5.1 3.8 3.3
East Asia & Pacific 69.0 71.0 73.0 53.4 37.2 23.0 2.5 1.9 1.8
Latin America & Caribbean 68.2 71.6 73.9 54.4 34.5 23.3 3.2 2.6 2.3
MENA 64.8 69.8 72.2 70.7 46.1 31.3 4.8 3.2 2.7
South Asia 58.5 61.9 65.0 120.3 88.8 67.0 4.2 3.3 2.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 49.6 49.8 53.8 174.6 154.8 121.2 6.2 5.6 5.0
World 65.4 67.2 69.4 89.9 74.7 57.9 3.2 2.7 2.5
Table 3: Demographic Trends in North Africa & Other Regions, 1990-2009
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012).
Age Dependency Ratio (% Working Population) Median Age
(over 65) (under 15)
1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2009
Algeria 6.7 6.7 6.7 80.9 55.5 39.6 18.1 21.7 26.2
Egypt 6.8 7.4 7.9 74.2 60.5 49.7 19.4 21.4 24.4
Libya 4.8 5.3 6.6 80.6 50.4 46.6 17.7 21.9 25.9
Morocco 6.8 7.6 8.3 70.4 54.4 42.1 19.7 22.6 26.3
Tunisia 8.0 10.0 10.0 66.5 47.2 33.7 20.8 24.7 28.9
Arab World 6.3 6.7 6.6 80.0 65.7 54.3 - - -
East Asia & Pacific 9.1 10.7 12.0 45.4 39.5 30.2 26.3 30.8 35.5
Latin America & Caribbean 8.3 9.2 10.6 61.4 51.0 42.7 22.0 24.5 27.6
MENA 6.7 7.2 7.0 80.9 61.8 46.9 - - -
South Asia 6.6 6.9 7.5 68.4 59.9 49.6 20.3 22.0 42.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.7 5.7 5.9 87.4 82.7 78.0 17.3 17.9 18.6
World 10.2 11.0 11.6 53.7 48.1 40.9 24.4 26.7 29.2
Table 4: Median Age and Age Dependency Ratios in North Africa & Other Regions, 1990-2010
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012) and UN Population database (2012). 
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Reflecting the fast pace of population growth in the past few decades,
Table 4 shows an age structure that is heavily skewed in favour of those
under 15. Although declining, concentration is most notable in Egypt
and Libya where the young (under 15) account for under half of the
working population as a whole.
Furthermore, overall dependency ratios (combining the share of those
below 15 and above 65) have been gradually declining: from highs of
around 75% (Tunisia) and 87% (Algeria) in 1990, these have now gone
down to around 43% (Tunisia) and 57% (Egypt) in 2009. Whilst this
implies a favourable change in the structure of the population in favour
of producers as opposed to consumers overall, as we shall see below
the rise in the number of those within the working population group also
poses serious challenges for the dynamics of the labour force and
employment in the region and this is likely to continue for a while. 
The young age structure of the region is also clear from low median
age figures (around mid- to upper 20s) which are on par with those
of South Asia (around 24-25 years) and well below that of East Asia’s
(35.5).
4.3 Labour Force and Employment 
Table 5 highlights the twin features of North Africa’s labour markets:
high labour force growth rates combined with lagging employment
and job opportunities. 
As seen above, high population growth over the past few decades
has generated a demographic momentum that continues to swell the
region’s workforce.  Although gradually moderating over the last two
decades, annual labour force growth in parts of North Africa has been
among the highest in the world. In Algeria and Libya, for instance,
annual labour force growth rates reached around 4.5%-5.5% in the
1990s exceeding all regions including Sub-Saharan Africa. In the past
decade, however, these growth rates have fallen considerably to
around 1%-2% per annum.
Labour Force Growth, 
Average Annual (%)
Employment-to-Population Ratios 
(% of population aged 15+)
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009 2001-2009
Algeria 5.4 4.5 3.6 2.2 23.7 22.9 27.6 36.3 31.5
Egypt 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.1 23.9 27.3 26.7 25.3 26.1
Libya 5.2 7.8 3.3 1.8 25.8 26.9 28.6 28.9 28.7
Morocco 3.3 2.6 2.4 1.3 39.8 39.5 35.6 34.9 35.3
Tunisia 3.4 2.5 2.0 1.3 27.8 25.6 23.7 22.7 23.2
Arab World 3.6 3.1 3.4 2.6 28.1 28.1 27.2 22.7 27.4
East Asia & Pacific 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.8 63.7 58.1 53.8 51.7 52.9
Latin America & Caribbean 3.0 2.7 2.6 1.4 48.2 46.2 44.5 45.1 44.8
MENA 3.6 3.5 1.8 2.4 28.0 28.2 28.0 28.5 28.2
South Asia 2.2 2.2 2.3 1.5 46.1 44.0 42.6 42.1 42.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.3 48.8 48.7 48.8 49.4 49.1
World 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.1 51.5 47.9 45.7 45.1 45.5
Table 5: Labour Force Growth Rates and Employment-to-Population Ratios
in North Africa & Other Regions, 1991-2009
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012).
There is no doubt that supply-side demographic developments pose
a serious challenge to the region’s ability to provide employment and
job opportunities for the significant number of labour market entrants
every year. Table 5 also shows that the regions’ fast labour force
growth goes hand in hand with generally low employment-to-
population ratios especially compared to other regions.  The Arab
world and the MENA region as a whole exhibit some of the lowest
ratios indicating the combined effects of both a large pool of job-
seekers and limited employment opportunities. For the MENA region
as a whole only about 28% of the population over 15 years are
employed and this ratio has been remarkably constant over the past
twenty years (even slightly declining in the Arab countries). In North
Africa, only Algeria has seen a relative improvement in recent years
(rising to over 31%) in contrast to Egypt where low employment-to-
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population ratios have persisted (around 25%-26%).  Reflecting the
severity of the employment situation in Tunisia, these ratios have been
the lowest as well as declining recently (from about 28% to around
23%). 
In general, the region’s employment-to-population ratios compare
poorly with the rest of the world, especially with that of South Asia
(42.4%), Latin America (45%) and East Asia (nearly 53%).  
Table 6 further indicates that the prognosis for the region’s employment
problem could indeed be even more challenging in the years to come.
It shows that the current population bulge within the working age
groups comes against some of the lowest overall labour force
participation rates (LFPR) in the world. The region’s overall LFRP is
around 51%-52% compared to 60%-70% in other regions. As more
of the population become active, this can only add to pressures on
jobs and employment in future. 
Labour Force Growth, 
Average Annual (%)
Labour Force, Female 
(% of total labour force)
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009 2001-2009 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009 2001-2009
Algeria 51.0 54.2 56.5 58.1 57.2 24.6 27.0 29.6 31.2 30.3
Egypt 50.1 49.2 48.3 48.1 48.2 25.8 24.7 24.0 23.7 23.9
Libya 47.7 49.7 51.7 52.4 52.0 16.7 20.5 22.6 22.7 22.7
Morocco 53.0 53.8 52.0 52.3 52.1 24.6 26.2 25.1 26.0 25.5
Tunisia 48.2 48.3 47.8 48.0 47.9 22.6 24.3 25.6 26.6 26.0
Arab World 51.1 51.5 51.4 52.0 51.7 23.0 23.8 24.2 24.5 24.3
East Asia & Pacific 74.9 74.2 72.7 71.4 72.1 43.6 43.6 43.6 43.7 43.7
Latin America & Caribbean 62.3 62.9 63.9 65.3 64.5 35.6 37.2 38.8 40.2 39.4
MENA 50.5 50.9 51.1 51.6 51.3 22.4 23.9 24.5 25.0 24.7
South Asia 60.5 59.5 58.8 58.8 58.8 28.1 28.0 27.9 28.7 28.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 69.4 69.7 70.2 70.5 70.3 42.2 42.7 43.2 43.3 43.2
World 66.2 65.6 65.0 64.8 64.9 39.5 39.6 39.7 40.0 39.8
Table 6: Labour Force Statistics in North Africa & Other Regions, 1991-2009 (Period Averages)
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012).
Underlying the region’s low LFPR is indeed very low female labour force
participation rates – again some of the lowest by world standards. In general,
female workers make up only about a quarter of the total workforce in North
African countries (Algeria has a higher ratio of just over 30%). As shown in Table
6, the norm elsewhere is around 40% (with the exception of South Asia where
it is around 28%). A rise in women’s economic activity levels in the coming
decades can only boost labour supplies adding to competition over scarce
jobs. Supply-side forces are thus likely to continue to compound the region’s
employment challenges and limiting its overall ability to generate new jobs.
To analyse the changing nature of jobs, the next two tables
disaggregate employment data by sector and status. Table 7 shows
that for those countries for which data is available (Algeria, Egypt and
Morocco), the services sector is the largest provider of jobs. In Algeria
and Egypt around half of all jobs are concentrated in the services.
Only in Morocco, where agricultural jobs have seen an upturn, has
the relative share of both services and industry been following a
downward trend (see also Table 2 above on the rapid pace of
agricultural growth in Morocco).
Table 8 shows that with the exception of Morocco, family workers
account for a low share of overall employment in North Africa. The
bulk of employment is made up of mainly wage and salaried workers.
Self-employment is relatively high in Egypt and Morocco although its
share has been broadly constant or falling in the last two decades.
In Tunisia, by contrast, possibly reflecting the size of the public sector,
wage and salaried workers account for around two-thirds of all
employment.  
Table 9 shows that MENA’s unemployment rate has been consistently
in double digits in the past twenty years and continues to exceed the
rate for other regions (around 12% during the period 2001-2009 against
4%-8% elsewhere). Within North Africa, Algeria has suffered the highest
unemployment rate and although following a downward trend more
recently, it has nevertheless averaged around 19% during 2001-09. In
Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia, unemployment rates have remained in
double digits ranging between 10%-15% in the past decade. 
Official unemployment data are widely believed to underestimate real
unemployment in the region. Moreover, a significant portion of those
‘employed’ fall into the ‘vulnerable employment’ category (unpaid family
workers and own-account workers). This category of employment lacks
the formality that goes with wage and salaried jobs and consists of
many informal occupations. For the MENA region as a whole, over one-
third of all those employed can be considered as being ‘vulnerable’ in
this sense. Given the precarious nature of some of these jobs, they can
pose an additional threat to unemployment figures. In North Africa, the
share is particularly high in Morocco, where it reaches over half of all
employment. As we saw previously (Table 8) this in reflects a high
proportion of self-employment (including contributing family workers)
in Morocco combined with a relatively low share of those with wage
and salaried employment. 
Although patchy, data in Table 9 show another important feature of MENA’s
unemployment: those with tertiary education feature prominently among
the unemployed. Worldwide, this ratio is highest in South Asia where a
staggering one-third of all unemployed are tertiary sector graduates. In North
Africa, this ratio is highest for Morocco (accounting for one-fifth of total
unemployment) followed by Algeria and Tunisia (with ratios around 10%). 
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Agriculture Industry Services
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001- 2005 2006-2009 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001- 2005 2006-2009 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001- 2005 2006-2009
Algeria - - 21.0 - - - 24.8 - - - 54.1 -
Egypt 34.8 30.1 29.7 31.5 22.3 22.4 20.6 22.4 42.9 47.3 49.6 46.0
Morocco 11.4 5.6 36.9 42.1 32.8 34.0 22.1 21.0 55.5 59.8 41.0 36.7
Contributing Family Workers Self-Employed Wage and Salaried Workers
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001- 2005 2006-2009 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001- 2005 2006-2009 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001- 2005 2006-2009
Algeria - - 7.8 - - - 36.8 - - - 55.9 -
Egypt 13.7 10.1 11.8 13.6 43.6 37.3 40.8 39.9 56.4 62.1 59.2 60.2
Libya - - - - - - - - - - - -
Morocco 19.2 21.5 25.8 25.1 51.5 48.5 55.2 55.3 48.5 47.4 42.4 44.1
Tunisia 0.9 7.6 7.9 - 29.2 31.1 33.4 - 70.2 68.3 66.5 -
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012).
Table 7: Employment by Economic Sector in North Africa, 1991-2009
(Period Averages - % Total) 
Table 8: Employment Status in North African Countries, 1991-2009 
(% Total Employed)
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012).
Another well-known and marked feature of unemployment in the region
is very high youth unemployment rates both among male and females
(ILO, 2013: 85-6; AfDB, 2012: 25-29). Despite the region’s improved
growth experience in the last decade, it appears that MENA’s Achilles
heel has been its inability to translate such growth into productive jobs
especially for its young population (see also Dhillon, 2009, and Radwan,
2006 on MENA youth unemployment).  As we have already seen,
MENA’s population is generally very young. The working-age youth
(those between 15 and 29 years of age) account for about one-quarter
to one-third of the total population across countries in the region.
Unfortunately, the youth bulge in the region suffers unemployment rates
that are well above the national average rates, which is already high by
world standards, as we saw earlier. Figure 1 shows that the youth
unemployment rate in 2010 was at least twice as high as the overall
national average rates in most Arab countries for which recent data is
available. In Iraq and the West Bank official youth unemployment rates
exceeded 40%, followed by Saudi Arabia (30%). In North Africa, these
ratios vary between 18%-29%.  Overall, Figure 1 shows that in Arab
countries, somewhere between two and four out of ten people aged
15-24 are unemployed.
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Unemployment Rate, Total 
(% of total labour force)
Unemployment with Tertiary
Education (% of total unem-
ployment)
Vulnerable Employment (a) 
(% of total employment)
1991-
1995
1996-
2000
2001-
2005
2006-
2009
2001-
2009
1991-
1995
1996-
2000
2001-
2005
2006-
2009
2001-
2009
1991-
1995
1996-
2000
2001-
2005
2006-
2009
2001-
2009
Algeria 23.8 27.6 22.5 12.5 18.7 10.8 10.0 10.0 31.6 31.6
Egypt 10.4 8.5 10.4 9.4 9.9 27.0 23.7 23.8 26.1 24.4
Libya
Morocco 18.0 16.3 11.6 9.8 10.8 11.9 17.9 20.2 20.2 47.5 47.0 51.6 51.4 51.5
Tunisia 15.9 14.6 14.2 14.5 1.7 4.9 9.2 9.2 20.9
Arab World 14.9 10.9 12.2
East Asia & Pacific 2.8 3.6 4.7 4.7 4.7
Latin America & Caribbean 7.2 8.6 8.9 7.3 8.2 11.8 12.3 11.9 32.7 30.3 30.3
MENA 12.6 13.0 10.5 11.7 36.7 36.7
South Asia 3.3 3.4 4.6 4.6 26.1 28.0 31.1 - 31.1
Sub-Saharan Africa
World 5.3 5.4 6.4 6.4
Note:  (a) Vulnerable Employment is unpaid family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of total employment. 
Source: Calculations from WDI (2012).
Table 9: Unemployment in North Africa & Other Regions, 1991-2009
Given the absolute size of the youth bulge, it is not surprising that the
youth make up a significant bulk of the total unemployment figures.
According to the ILO, young people accounted for as high as 63% 
of all unemployed in Egypt in 2007. The same ratio was two-fifth in 
Morocco in 2009 (KILM, 2009).  Overall, ILO estimates put male youth
unemployment rate in 2012 at more than three times the male adult
unemployment rate in the region (18.5% against 5.7%) with a similar
rate of 37% for female youth unemployment - or ‘more than six times
the rate for adult men’ (ILO, 2013: 85). 
Our discussion on North African countries’ ability to generate jobs has
so far concentrated on three common indicators: unemployment rates,
labour force participation rates and employment-to-population ratios.
While these are useful indicators, we can also gain further insight into
the dynamics of employment creation and its relationship to economic
growth by examining employment elasticities (Kapsos, 2005; see 
Saget, 2000 for a discussion of the relationship between growth and
employment in general). This concept indicates the employment intensity
of growth or net new job creation for each 1% growth in GDP and can
help us analyse the extent to which growth may be attributed to gains
either in labour productivity or in increases in labour supplies.  An early
study for the period 1991-2003 found that MENA and Sub-Saharan
Africa had the highest of all regions’ overall employment elasticities
indicating that employment growth was in the main driven by rising
labour supplies in these two regions rather than by gains in productivity
(Kapsos, 2005: 19).  
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Notes: * Youth unemployment refers to those aged 15-24 years; 
(a)-2008; (b)-2007; (c)-2009
Source: ILO (2011).
Figure 1: Total Unemployment and Youth Unemployment Rates* (%) 
Selected Arab Countries (2010)
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ILO’s computations for individual countries in North Africa are summarised
in Table 10 for the period 1992-2008 disaggregated by gender into 
four-yearly sub-periods (KILM, 2009).  It can be seen that Algeria has
consistently had high overall and gender-specific employment elasticities
with an upward trend in recent years. As we have seen above, this is
mainly a reflection of demographic trends such as high fertility rates 
in the past (Table 3) translated into high labour force growth rates
(Table 5) and high volumes of female labour force entrants (Table 6). In
Libya, following a marked rise in the late 1990s, employment elasticities
have been declining noticeably, and in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, a
moderate downward trend has become the norm in recent years.  
Evidence also suggests that economic growth has favoured job creation
for males compared to females. The only exception is Morocco, where
in recent years female employment elasticity has overtaken male
employment elasticity (0.43 against 0.31 in 2004-08), again perhaps
an indication of the large numbers of family workers in this country (see
Table 8 above).  
With low women’s labour force participation rates in the region (see
Table 6 above), it is possible that we will see higher female elasticities
in the future given the scope for catching up with males in this regard. 
4.4 Poverty and Inequality
Judged by international standards, MENA’s income-based poverty
rates appear to be surprisingly low (Bibi and Nabli, 2009; Adams and
Page, 2003; Bargawi and McKinley, 2011). If adopting narrowly defined
poverty reduction targets, therefore, pro-poor growth strategies risk
missing out on large numbers of low income people who fall just above
fixed international poverty thresholds. While this raises some questions
about the choice of suitable thresholds for defining poverty headcount
ratios, doubts also arise about the quality and accuracy of poverty
data, and hence their applicability, in the region. 
Figure 2 shows this apparent paradox: those living on less than $1.25
a day (in 2005 PPP US$) add up to only 4% of the total population in
the Arab region. This appears to conform to headcount ratios for much
richer regions such as Latin America (5%) and is far below that for other
developing regions such as South Asia (40%) and Sub-Saharan Africa
(50%). Although raising the benchmark to $2 a day or $2.75 a day does
make a significant and disproportionate difference in the Arab countries
(more so than anywhere else), the overall poverty picture, judged by
fixed international poverty lines, still seems comparatively favourable in
the region (19% live below $2 a day and 40% below $2.75 a day).
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Total Male Female
1992-1995 1996-2000 2000- 2004 2004-2008 1992-1995 1996-2000 2000- 2004 2004-2008 1992-1995 1996-2000 2000- 2004 2004-2008
Algeria 0.87 1.01 1.29 1.53 1.45 1.69 1.63 2.18 0.68 0.76 1.15 1.24
Egypt 0.67 0.48 0.82 0.57 0.66 0.66 1.30 0.87 0.67 0.44 0.69 0.49
Libya -0.82 2.00 0.49 0.38 -1.51 3.49 0.66 0.62 -0.68 1.62 0.44 0.32
Morocco 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.89 1.00 0.50 0.31 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.43
Tunisia 0.79 0.40 0.55 0.42 1.30 0.61 0.89 0.46 0.64 0.34 0.43 0.40
Table 10: Employment Elasticities in North Africa, 1992-2008
Source: KILM (2009).
Although limited, data for North African countries presented in Table 11
confirms this overall picture. Two patterns can be seen: in Tunisia and
Morocco, where poverty ratios were above the regional norms (but still
low by international standards), there has been a marked downward
trend (falling from 6.5%-6.8% to around 2.5% for the lower benchmark
of $1.25 a day). In Egypt, a similar benchmark ratio has been very low
but broadly stable or rising moderately (around 1.8%-2% between 2000
and 2005).
Raising the benchmark to $2/day, however, does make a considerable
difference even though a similar pattern follows. For instance, Morocco
has seen the sharpest fall in the incidence of poverty thus defined (from
24.4% to 14%) followed by Tunisia (falling from 20.4% to 12.8%) and
Egypt where the reduction has been much more modest (down from
19.3% to 18.4%). At face value, thus Morocco and Tunisia’s poverty
incidence is now on par with that of the Latin American region (around
12%) and far above that for other parts of the world (for instance East
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Source: UNDP (2012: 22).
Figure 2: Regional Poverty Headcount Ratios at $1.25, $2 and $2.75 a Day 
(in 2005 PPP Dollars, % of Population) 
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Survey Period Earliest Survey Latest Survey Period Earliest Survey Latest Survey
Algeria 1995 6.8 23.6
Egypt 2000-2005 1.8 2.0 19.3 18.4
Morocco 1998-2007 6.8 2.5 24.4 14.0
Tunisia 1995-2000 6.5 2.6 20.4 12.8
Table 11: Poverty Headcount Ratios at $1.25 and $2 a Day in North Africa 
Source: KILM (2009).
Asia at 40% and South Asia and the Sub-Saharan Africa both at 74%;
see Figure 2).
Although it appears that MENA poverty headcount ratios are highly
sensitive to the choice of the benchmark, there are good reasons to
ask whether fixed international poverty lines can indeed be appropriate
guides for estimating the real incidence of poverty in the region.  As
stated above, doubts have persisted about the estimation and
application of poverty data in the MENA region as a whole. Some have
questioned whether income-based measurements of poverty (such
as headcount ratios and the Gini coefficient) result in optimistic
measures for improving the conditions of poor in MENA.  Breisinger
et al, for instance, find that MENA’s reduction in income-based poverty
measures are out of line with the worldwide average, ‘while reduction
rates in child under-nutrition are similar’ (2012: 9). They attribute these
discrepancies partly to data inaccuracies and partly to the importance
of non-income factors (such as health and education) that may be
relatively less developed in the region and are missed out in poverty
measures that are reliant on income alone. 
Others have questioned the methodology used by international poverty
estimates in the MENA context. For instance, the application of universal
PPPs may not be representative of relative price levels faced by very
poor consumers, leading to distorted comparisons of poverty or
deprivation across countries in the MENA region (Sabry, 2010, argues
that household expenditure surveys indicate a much worse poverty
situation in Egypt). Based on an alternative methodology which takes
into account per capita consumption expenditures, UNDP re-estimates
new poverty lines dismissing the $1.25/day benchmark as being far too
low and favouring the $2.00/day line as ‘a more appropriate benchmark’
for global poverty measurement (2011: 24).
Similar misgivings are also encountered in relation to the empirical
evidence on inequality in MENA, where, Gini coefficients estimated from
household expenditure surveys seem to indicate moderate levels of
inequality by international standards. In general, it is believed that these
surveys miss out on the top 5% income groups, hence indicating
stagnant or falling per capita consumption as opposed to results based
on national accounts (UNDP, 2011: 26-7). 
Table 12 summarises available evidence on inequality in North Africa.
Based on evidence offered by the Gini index, Egypt saw a reduction in
its inequality, whereas in Tunisia the trend was almost stagnant. Despite
sharp poverty reduction in Morocco seen above, the Gini index indicates
that inequality in fact worsened between 1999 and 2007 (rising from
39.5 to 40.9). 
An examination of income concentration at the top and bottom ends
of income offers a similar picture. In Egypt, the ratio of income for the
top 20% to the bottom 20% declined (from 3.2 to 2.9 in the period
2000-2008) and in Tunisia it remained stable (around 5.5 between 1995
and 2005). Again, Morocco stands out in this respect with an income
concentration in favour of the top income group. 
In the next section, we turn to an examination of access to social goods
and amenities in the region to get a better understanding of growth and
its implications for welfare and poverty in the years under consideration.
4.5 Social Goods and Services 
4.5.1 Health
As we saw above (Tables 3 and 4), in recent years the region’s
demographic transition has been marked by improvements in life
expectancy combined with a sustained fall in infant mortality rates. Table
13 provides other selected health indicators for which comparative data
are available. It can be seen that in the last decade, maternal mortality
ratios in the MENA region as a whole have fallen steeply reaching levels
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Earliest Survey Latest Survey
Survey Period
Ratio of top 20%
To Bottom 20%
Gini Index
Ratio of top 20%
To Bottom 20%
Gini Index
Algeria 1995 3.9 35.3
Egypt 2000-2008 3.2 32.8 2.9 30.8
Morocco 1999-2007 4.8 39.5 5.1 40.9
Tunisia 1995-2005 5.6 41.7 5.5 41.4
Table 12: Indicators of Income Distribution
Source: Calculations from WDI (2012).
that are now comparable to those of East Asia and Latin America (down
from 200 per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 74 per 100,000 live births
in 2009).  Among North African countries, Libya and Algeria have lagged
behind even though their decline has been equally emphatic (from 220-
300 to around 100 per 100,000 live births in the same period). By
contrast, in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt these rates are now down to
around 60 per 100,000 live births, which is well below those both for
the Arab world and other regions.
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Maternal Mortality Ratio 
(per 100,000 live births)
Incidence of Tuberculosis 
(per 100,000 people)
2000 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009
Algeria 220 140 97 66 87 90
Egypt 230 100 66 34 26 18
Libya 300 170 100 40 40 40
Morocco 99 67 58 147 109 91
Tunisia 130 84 56 29 24 25
Arab World 360 290 230
East Asia & Pacific 210 120 78 167 136 114
Latin America & Caribbean 140 100 80 88 61 43
MENA 200 120 74 56 50 38
South Asia 620 410 220 215 215 192
Sub-Saharan Africa 850 740 500 210 276 271
World 400 320 210 144 141 128
Source: Calculations from WDI (2012).
Table 13: Selected Health Indicators in North Africa & Other Regions (2000-09)
The same table also shows that the incidence of tuberculosis in MENA
has been low by world standards and broadly declining (by 2009 such
cases were on average affecting 38 per 100,000 people in MENA,
down from 56 per 100,000 a decade earlier). Within North Africa, we
see a dual pattern where the rates in Morocco and Algeria are the
highest (around 90 per 100,000), while Tunisia and Egypt have the
lowest rates and Libya’s rates conform to the MENA’s average at
around 40 per 100,000. 
Table 14 provides data on health expenditures and the share of the public
sector in such expenditures.  We can see that the share of total (public
and private) health expenditure in MENA’s GDP over the last decade has
been generally low at around 4%-5%, which is about half of the world
average (which includes developed countries). This ratio falls between that
for East Asia and Latin America on one hand (7%) and South Asia on the
other (4%). Among North African countries, high relative shares are seen
in Tunisia (6.2%) with much lower shares in Libya and Algeria (around 4%). 
A regional comparison of the relative importance of government spending
on health (judged by its share in total government budget) is not possible
due to lack of data, but in Algeria and Tunisia state spending on health
seems to constitute a much higher share of total public spending 
than elsewhere (around 9-10% of general government expenditure
respectively). 
The relative importance of the public sector in the provision of health
services is seen much more clearly from the composition of the total
health expenditures. The share of public sector in MENA’s total health
spending (private and public) has been edging up to reach around
58%-60% in 2010 (in comparative terms, it is only below East Asia’s
at 70%). A closer look at the North African region, however, shows
a dual pattern. In the two oil economies of Algeria and Libya public
health spending exceeds private spending and its share has been
rising (reaching about two-thirds to three-quarters of total health
spending). In Egypt and Morocco, however, the opposite is the case
with private health spending exceeding public health spending. In
Tunisia the split is approximately even and has stayed broadly stable
at around 54% in the past decade.
4.5.2 Education
Table 15 shows that gender parity in both secondary and tertiary
education in the Arab world and the MENA region as a whole has been
improving steadily in the past decade. This trend has been even more
marked in the tertiary sector with the ratio of female to male enrolments
in MENA jumping by almost a quarter in less than ten years to reach
parity (up from 83% to 100.7%) and near parity in the Arab countries
(up from 80% to 96.3%).
The picture in North Africa is patchy but for the two countries for which
data is available – Tunisia and Morocco – the same picture is observed:
in Tunisia both in secondary and tertiary sectors females have overtaken
males in education reflecting the trend seen in other regions such as in
East Asia and Latin America. 
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Source: WDI (2012).
Table 14: Expenditure on Health in North Africa & Other Regions (2000-2009)
Total Health Expenditure 
(% GDP)
General Gov. Expenditure
on Health (% General Gov.
Expenditure)
General Gov. Expenditure
on Health (% Total 
Expenditure on Health)
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 20010 2000 2005 2010
Algeria 3.5 3.4 4.2 8.9 9.9 9.2 73.3 75.8 77.9
Egypt 5.4 5.2 4.7 7.3 6.7 5.7 40.5 40.6 37.4
Libya 3.3 2.5 3.9 6.0 5.5 5.5 57.2 61.8 68.8
Morocco 4.2 5.1 5.2 4.0 6.6 6.6 29.4 28.7 38.0
Tunisia 6.0 6.2 6.2 8.1 10.7 10.7 54.9 51.5 54.3
Arab World 4.2 3.8 4.7 57.2 60.8 60.9
East Asia & Pacific 6.6 6.7 6.9 72.4 67.8 69.5
Latin America & Caribbean 6.6 6.9 7.7 9.8 48.9 47.2 50.2
MENA 4.7 4.4 5.1 54.2 58.3 57.8
South Asia 4.3 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.5 28.1 24.4 30.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.0 6.6 6.5 10.00 40.0 39.3 45.3
World 9.2 9.9 10.4 57.8 58.6 62.8
While an encouraging trend, the rising trend for female participation in
tertiary education, however, should be seen against a background of
generally limited opportunities for women in social and economic
spheres. As we saw earlier, women’s labour force participation rates
in North Africa are among the lowest in the world: female workers
make up only about a quarter of the workforce in the region, whereas
the norm elsewhere is over 40% (Table 6). Women also have fewer
opportunities for studying abroad and are generally also over-
represented among the unemployed. As we have argued before,
should improvements in education and skills for female workers boost
their LFPRs in due course, this can only increase the supply of women
in the labour market and exacerbate the region’s unemployment
challenge. 
Table 16 shows that public expenditure on education as a proportion
of GDP in North Africa has been generally steady around 3%-6%
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Source: Calculated from WDI (2012). 
Table 15: Ratio of Female to Male Enrolment in Secondary and Tertiary Education
in North Africa & Other Regions (2000 and 2009)
Ratio of Female to Male Enrolment  (%)
2000 2009 2000 2009
Algeria 101.8 144.2
Egypt 92.2
Libya 97.1
Morocco 79.3 72.3 87.1
Tunisia 103.4 105.8 150.5
Arab World 88.7 91.4 80.1 96.3
East Asia & Pacific 95.6 104.7 84.4 104.0
Latin America & Caribbean 106.8 108.1 118.5 126.0
MENA 90.1 92.7 82.6 100.7
South Asia 74.2 88.4 64.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 81.0 79.2 65.2 63.3
World 91.6 96.6 99.1 108.2
Public Expenditure on Education
(% of GDP)
Public Expenditure on Education
(% of Total Government 
Expenditure)
Public Expenditure per Pupil 
(% of GDP per capita)
1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 
Algeria 4.3 20.3
Egypt 4.8 3.8 15.9 12.2 18.1
Libya 2.7
Morocco 5.5 5.7 5.5 25.1 27.1 25.9 25.7 24.6 24.1
Tunisia 6.2 6.4 6.4 17.8 19.9 22.2 21.4 22.5 23.5
Table 16: Public Expenditure on Education in North Africa (1998-2009)
Source: UNESCO (2012).
between 1998 and 2009. Tunisia tops the list with its share around
6%, whereas Libya comes at the bottom end with a share of less than
3% during 1998-2001 (data for more recent years is not available). 
The importance of public provision is also seen from the fact that
educational expenditure amounts to around one-fifth of the total
government budget with the exception of Egypt, where the budgetary
share of expenditure has been low and declining (from around 16%
to 12% between 2002 and 2009). Normalising for the number of the
pupils, public expenditure on education per pupil in Morocco and
Tunisia has been around a quarter of GDP per capita.
4.5.3 Urban Amenities
With large numbers of population and jobs concentrated  in urban centres,
access to civic amenities and hygiene standards are important aspects of
living standards for millions of urban inhabitants during the process of
transformation and structural change.  Table 17 shows that with the urban
proportion continually rising in the last two decades, urban populations
now exceed the numbers residing in rural areas in North African
countries. The only exception is Egypt where the ratio is at 43%. In
general, the proportion of town inhabitants is around two-thirds of the total
(in Libya it is the highest at around 78% and in Morocco around 57%). 
Accompanying urbanisation, there has also been a marked decline in the
number and proportion of those living in urban slums. In Egypt and
Morocco, the only two countries for which data is available, there have
been significant reductions both in the absolute numbers and the
proportion of slum dwellers since 1990. This has been combined with
general improvements in water and sanitation standards (Table 18).
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Population in Urban Areas 
(% Total Population)
Population Living in Slums 
(% Urban Population)
Population Living in Slums 
(‘000s)
1990 2000 2005 2009 1990 2000 2005 2007 1990 2000 2005 2007
Algeria 52.1 59.8 63.3 66.5 11.8 1.507
Egypt 43.5 42.6 42.6 42.8 50.2 28.1 17.1 14.4 12.029 7.978 5.312 5.505
Libya 75.7 76.4 77 77.9 35.2 1.242
Morocco 48.4 53.3 55 56.7 37.4 24.2 13.1 13.1 4.490 3.713 2.196 2.276
Tunisia 57.9 63.4 65.3 67.3 9 425
Table 17: Urban Population Living in Slums in North African Countries (1990-2009)
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012) and MDG Goals Indicators (2012). 
Population Using Improved
Drinking-Water Sources (%)
Population Using Improved
Sanitation Facilities (%)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
Algeria 94 93 89 85 83 88 90 92 94 95
Egypt 90 93 96 98 99 72 79 86 93 94
Libya 54 54 54 97 97 97 97 97
Morocco 74 76 78 80 81 53 59 64 68 69
Tunisia 81 86 90 94 94 74 78 81 85 85
Table 18: Water and Sanitation in North Africa (1990-2008)
Source: WHO (2012). 
To summarise this section, we have seen that overall North African
countries have fared relatively better recently both in historical terms
and compared to other regions.  They have enjoyed respectable
average annual real GDP growth rates of 4%-5% during the period
2000-10. Moreover, the same decade witnessed many other
encouraging advances in other aspects: life expectancy rose,
educational and health indicators improved, the number and
proportion of slum dwellers declined and more people enjoyed civic
amenities such as access to improved drinking water and sanitation.
Judged by international poverty benchmarks, even poverty and
inequality data seem to offer a more favourable picture of the region’s
experience in these years. The demographic experience of the region,
however, was its main challenge with some of the highest national
and youth unemployment rates and the lowest female participation
in the workforce, there is much that the countries in the region need
to do to enhance their prospects for achieving inclusive growth.
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5. Measuring Inclusive Growth in North Africa 
This section draws from the various development indicatorsdiscussed above to arrive at an estimation of a combined
single measure of inclusive growth for the North African countries
under discussion. This will then be used to compare their
performance both over time and in relation to a selection of other
peer countries.
As mentioned above, the choice of a single measure or indicator for
inclusive growth is still in early stages. For instance, McKinley (2010)
has proposed using a weighted scoring system that embraces a
number of key growth statistics and a broad set of development
indicators. But even if focusing on economic outcomes alone, there
remains the problem of agreeing what elements to include and what
weights to adopt when constructing a universal ‘inclusive growth’
index.  
The UNDP’s annual ranking of countries based on their estimated
Human Development Indicators (HDI) can be taken as a readymade
– albeit limited – measure of such an indicator. Introduced in 1990,
the HDI provides an alternative to conventional measures of
national development, such as the level of income and the rate of
economic growth. HDIs offer a broader definition of well-being and
provide a composite measure based on three basic dimensions of
human development: income, life expectancy and education. These
are given equal weightings and the resulting combined score is
used for ranking countries according to their performance annually.
Since 2010, UNDP has also offered an inequality-adjusted score
(IHDI) to capture the effect of inequality on these scores and hence
on country rankings. These two measures would in fact be the
same if there were no inequality and in that sense the ‘IHDI is the
actual level of human development (taking into account inequality),
while the HDI can be viewed as an index of the potential human
development that could be achieved if there is no inequality’ (UNDP,
2012a). 
Table 19 gives the HDI and IHDI rankings for the five North African
countries out of 187 countries in total for the former and 134
countries for the latter in 2011. Also given are the rankings for the
sub-components of income, health, education, inequality and
gender.  We have also provided the normalised rankings for HDI
and IHDI to take into account the variable number of countries for
which these rankings are possible. 
A number of interesting issues emerge here. First, for these five
countries rankings based on income alone are generally a good
proxy for their overall HDI rankings since it appears as if the
inclusion of the other two indicators (health and education) only
makes a marginal difference to their overall HDI rankings. The only
exception is Morocco where a severe underperformance in
education leads to a significant divergence between its income
rankings and overall HDI. 
Second, normalised HDI rankings indicate that Egypt and Morocco
are in the bottom median of all country rankings (approximately
40% and 31% respectively), whereas Tunisia and Algeria rank at
the median level (around 50%). Somewhat surprisingly perhaps,
Libya’s HDI comes on top, situated in the top one-third of all
country rankings (66%).  
Third, gender rankings help Tunisia – with a rank of 45 out of 134
countries (significantly above its overall HDI or any other indicators).
Normalised gender rankings (not reproduced in the table) indicate
stable rankings for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (data for Egypt is
missing). 
Fourth and last, normalised Inequality-adjusted HDIs in the same
table indicate a slight rise in the rankings of Egypt, Morocco and
Tunisia, the three countries for which such data is available. This
shows that taking into account inequality in the region in fact makes
a modest positive effect on their overall rankings.
While useful, UNDP’s HDIs only encompass a limited number of
indicators we covered in Section 4 above. To get a more holistic
indication of the nature of inclusive growth, in the rest of this section
we attempt to widen the range of economic and social indicators
to re-estimate the relative performance of each of the North African
countries in relation to others and over time. This is done by taking
into account the country rankings obtained for a range of indicators
specified below and constructing a normalised score (between 0
and 100) for each country. To smooth out annual fluctuations in
individual ranks, we use three year averages first for the first three
years (2000-02) and then the last three years of the decade (2008-
10). This is repeated for all indicators (see a list below) with the
exception of the inequality indicator for which, due to data
limitations, we use an average of the Gini values available for the
periods 2000-04 and 2005-10, respectively. Obviously, the period
is of special interest given its proximity to the events leading to the
Arab uprisings in many countries of the region. 
The overall inclusive scores for each country (IGi) are computed as
a geometric mean for that country of the standardised values for
different indicators (defined below) according to the following
formula:
(1)
where: 
(i = 1,… m:  country i included in the dataset); 
(j = 1,… n:  indicator j included in the dataset); and 
sji is a standardised score for the rankings obtained in respect of
indicator j for country i. Standardised scores are obtained using the
following formula (for each indicator for each country):
(2)
where rj is a country’s rank in respect of indicator j in (descending
order) and mj is  the total number of countries for which data for
indicator sj is available. This takes into account the variable number
of countries for which data is available for specific indicators. In
general, due to data limitations, the number of the countries declines
for variables such as inequality and the structure of employment
(percentage of the wage and salaried in total employment) – a factor
that is arguably biased against less developed countries (see
detailed data and methodology in Appendix Tables 1 and 2). 
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Income Health Education Inequality Gender Overall HDI Inequality-Adjusted
HDI 
Rank Normalised
rank
(max=100;
min=0)
Rank Normalised
rank
(max=100;
min=0)
Algeria 91 93 107 71 96 48.9
Egypt 107 92 129 78 - 113 39.8 80 40.6
Libya 64 65 69 51 64 66.1
Morocco 115 108 147 95 104 130 30.6 91 32.3
Tunisia 96 70 110 81 45 94 50.0 66 51.1
Total countries 81871 188 188 134 146 187 100 134 100
Table 19: Human Development Rankings by Various Components,
North African Countries, 2011
Source:  Ranks data from UNDP (2012b). Normalised ranks are author’s calculations based on the equation (2) explained in the text below.
IGi  = . …  
sji = 100 . ( )i 
Standardised scores obtained from equation (2) take a maximum
value of 100 (for the highest ranked) and 0 (for the lowest ranked)
for each country for each indicator.  A list of a total of thirteen
indicators used is given in Table 20 grouped under their broad
categories (growth, health and demographics, etc). All indicators
are given equal weights (1/n) when computing the overall inclusive
growth index (IGi) in equation 1. All data are taken from the World
Bank (WDI, 2012) with the exception of Governance, for which we
use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) provided by
Transparency International (2012). 
Table 21 provides a summary of estimated values for the ‘Inclusive
growth Index’ (IGi as in equation 1 above) for the five North African
countries for the periods 2000-02 and 2008-10 and compares
them with similar data computed for a select number of Middle
Eastern countries and other LDC peers.  A number of interesting
patterns emerge.
First, all five North African countries underperform internationally
considering that they appear in the bottom median of all countries
(lowest score is 0 and highest 100). In comparative terms though, Tunisia
does best followed by Egypt. Algeria appears at the bottom of the
pecking order followed by Morocco and Libya (in that order for 2008-10).
Second, the trend over the decade seems to have improved for all
these five countries though to varying extents. Libya and Algeria do
best (in that order) followed by Egypt. Morocco and especially
Tunisia and show a more modest improvement.  Our results –
based on a wider set of development indicators seem to diverge
from the HDIs and do not seem to provide a ready explanation for
the political turmoil and uprisings encountered in the region
(especially Egypt, Tunisia and Libya). Whilst important, thus, the
economic origins of the ‘Arab Spring’ must be understood
alongside its political roots to shed light on complex processes that
saw power swept from under the feet of the region’s authoritarian
regimes (AfDB, 2012: 25). 
More insight can be obtained by further interrogating the data for
other Middle East and developing countries.  First within the Middle
East region, Iran and especially Syria follow a deteriorating
trajectory in this period (with a decline of 13.1% and 19.4%,
respectively).  This is in contrast with all other countries where a
strong trend of improvement is observed: Yemen by as much as
almost 30%; Lebanon by 25% and Turkey and Israel by about 15%.  
Among other LDCs a number of interesting results emerge. Of
BRICS, China, Brazil and India indicate an improvement. This is in
sharp contrast to Russia and South Africa, where a significant
deterioration is observed (20%-30%).  Another strong performer is
Indonesia followed, to a lesser extent, by Chile. This is in contrast
to South Korea and Malaysia where a modest deterioration is
indicated by these data.  
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Broad Categories Specific Indicators (Sj) No of countries in the Dataset (mj) 
Growth 1. Real GDP Growth2. Real per capita GDP Growth
194
194
Health and Demographics
3. Public Health Expenditure (% GDP)
4. Mortality Rate Under-5  (per 1,000)
5. Life Expectancy at Birth 
6. Tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)
187
193
196
202
Labour Force and Employment 7. Wage & Salaried (% of total employment) 8. Employment-to-Population Ratios (% of 15+)
92
173
Gender 9. Female Labour Force (% of total workforce) 184
Education 10. Ratio of Female to Male Secondary Enrolment (%) 163
Sanitation 11. Population Using Improved Sanitation Facilities (%) 178
Inequality 12. Gini Index 99
Governance 13. Corruption Perception Index 179
Table 20: Indicators Used for Computation of Inclusive Growth Index
Figure 3 takes the analysis for North African countries one step
further by conducting sensitivity analysis for the 13 indicators used
for the construction and estimation of the IG index both for 2000-
02 and 2008-10. In this figure, a baseline of 100% indicates no
change and each data point shows the re-estimated IG if a
particular indicator were to be excluded from the calculations (given
a weight of zero). Figures above 100% (baseline) indicate the
indicator has a negative effect on the overall index and hence its
elimination (as shown in these figures) will improve the index. The
opposite is true of the figures below 100% (i.e., they have an overall
positive effect on the IG index and their elimination lowers the IG
score). 
It can be seen that the employment indicators (both employment-
to-population ratio and female workforce as a % of total labour
force) have the largest impact in all five countries. This is especially
true of Algeria (particularly in 2000-02) as well as in Tunisia.
Ironically perhaps, the inclusion of the inequality indicator (Gini)
improves the situation in Egypt. By contrast, almost all of these five
countries do well in respect of sanitation and education indicators
whose elimination lowers their IG index below 100%. Last but not
least, Morocco shows a more varied pattern since its IG index
shows sensitivity to the structure of employment as well. 
These results are interesting and to a large extent reinforce our
descriptive discussion of a wide range of indicators in Section 4
above. It should be emphasised, however, that the methodology
used here is at best a starting point for estimation of a single
inclusive growth estimator. Both the choice of indicators selected
for our purposes and weights attached to them are unlikely to 
meet with universal agreement.  Nevertheless, the methodology
developed and offered here is flexible enough to incorporate other
variations both for choice of indicators and weights applied. In 
that respect, it is hoped that this approach will encourage
methodological debate and prove useful in stimulating attempts to
quantify inclusive growth. 
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2000-02 2008-10 Change
North Africa
Algeria(b) 24.1 29.6 22.8%
Egypt 34.7 38.8 11.8%
Libya(b) 29.4 37.6 28.1%
Morocco 29.2 31.6 8.3%
Tunisia 41.3 42.4 2.8%
Other Middle East
Iran(b) 32.2 27.9 -13.1%
Israel 59.7 62.2 15.9%
Jordan 39.7 42.6 7.4%
Lebanon(b) 35.2 43.8 24.7%
Saudi Arabia(b) 25.5 27.1 6.5%
Syria 36.2 29.1 -19.4%
Turkey 31.7 36.3 14.4%
Yemen 16.7 21.6 29.6%
Selected LDCs
China 47.8 56.5 18.2%
Chile 47.2 50.2 6.3%
Brazil 41.1 45.0 9.6%
India 25.2 28.8 14.3%
Indonesia 27.4 31.6 15.2%
South Korea 62.0 54.1 -12.7%
Malaysia 54.4 48.8 -10.6%
Mexico 41.6 40.8 -2.0%
Russia 53.4 42.9 -19.7%
South Africa 30.1 20.6 -31.8%
Table 21: Estimated 'Inclusive Growth' Scores, 2000-02 and 2008-10
Based on Normalised Ranks (max=100; min = 0)(a) 
Note:  (a) Based on Normalised Country Rankings for indicators specified in Table 20. Mean values of ranks estimated are based on geometric means (for details and methodology, see 
Appendix Tables 1 & 2).
(b) Data for these countries exclude ‘Inequality’ and ‘Governance’ for 2000-02 and ‘Inequality’ for 2008-10. 
Source:  Author’s estimates based on data from WDI (2012) and Transparency International (2012) as specified in Appendix Tables 1 & 2.
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Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis 2000-2002
Source: Author’s calculations based on Inclusive Growth computations as in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. Figures above 100% as baseline indicate a particular indicator has a negative effect
on the overall IG score and hence its elimination (as shown in these figures) will improve the index. The opposite is true of figures below 100% (i.e., the particular indicator has an overall
positive effect on the IG score if its elimination as in these figures pushes IG below 100%).  
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Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis 2008-2010
Source: Author’s calculations based on Inclusive Growth computations as in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. Figures above 100% as baseline indicate a particular indicator has a negative effect
on the overall IG score and hence its elimination (as shown in these figures) will improve the index. The opposite is true of figures below 100% (i.e., the particular indicator has an overall
positive effect on the IG score if its elimination as in these figures pushes IG below 100%).  
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6. Inclusive Growth: Towards A New Orthodoxy? 
This paper has shown that the longstanding relationshipbetween growth and distribution in economics has been
revived in recent years with greater focus on inclusive growth as
growth that is capable of benefiting much larger sections of the
society. One main intellectual driver behind this has come from the
experience of Asia, where an impressive record of rapid growth
and structural transformation has indicated that significant
reductions in poverty can be achieved against a rising trend of
inequality. 
Recent developments in the Arab region have provided further
inspirations for this line of enquiry with mass protests and the
downfall of authoritarian regimes raising major new questions about
past growth models.  Coming against the background of a
paradoxically successful period of growth especially in the last
decade, these events have underscored the need for new and fresh
thinking about the nature and type of growth in the MENA region
and other parts of the developing world.  As the new Arab
Republics begin to face the challenges of their uncertain economic
futures, the imperatives for achieving a more inclusive growth
trajectory for the benefit of the widest social and economic
groupings is more pressing than ever before.  
Our extensive descriptive review of a broad set of development
indicators for the past two decades (in Section 4) and an estimation
of a combined single score for measuring ‘inclusive growth’ for
individual countries (in Section 5) has shown that overall North Africa
has fared relatively better recently both in historical terms and
compared to many other regions.  Overall, the last decade witnessed
a reversal of past sluggish or stagnant growth trends, achieving
average annual real GDP growth rates of 4%-5% during the period
2000-10. This applied also in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya where mass revolts and uprisings brought down long reins of
autocracy after 2010. 
Moreover, the same decade saw a raft of other encouraging
achievements: life expectancy rose, educational and health
indicators improved, the number and proportion of slum dwellers
declined and more people enjoyed civic amenities such as access
to improved drinking water and sanitation. Although more
controversial, even poverty and inequality data speak favourably
of the region’s experience in recent years if judged by the
standard fixed international poverty benchmarks (although there
are good reasons to believe that these indicators may understate
the extent and incidence of poverty and inequality in the region). 
The main area where the region has noticeably lagged behind the
rest of the world in recent years is its demographic momentum. As
we saw, despite the fact that a much delayed demographic
transition (combined falling fertility and mortality rates) has now
taken hold, decades of high fertility and fast population growth have
nevertheless generated a momentum that continues to present
major challenges both at present and for years to come. Taking
population size and growth into account qualifies some of the
positive economic achievements of the region in the past decade.
GDP growth in per capita terms appears much more modest, but
above all, it also explains why the region’s overall unemployment
rate, which is high by most standards, is translated into a major
and pressing challenge of youth unemployment. Strong supply-side
demographic pressures will no doubt continue to persist for years
and will accentuate the challenge of achieving inclusive growth in
North Africa. 
The demographic dimensions of the region’s experience of growth
and development thus merit close attention in debates about
inclusive growth. It is clear that with a highly skewed age structure
and a large youth bulge the benefits of growth will have to reach the
young to make sure that North African countries can both realise
their true economic potential as well as share the fruits of their
growth widely. This leads us to conclude that no matter what notion
of inclusive growth we adopt, for the region, generating high quality
employment will be an essential element and will pose one of main
challenges to prospects for achieving inclusive growth. This was
also clearly borne out by our estimations of the IG score in Section
5 and the sensitivity analysis which underscored yet again the
importance of employment indicators in the region.
While the main task of this paper has been to examine the
relevance and application of inclusive growth debates in the North
African context, it seems appropriate to end by reflecting on these
debates and their ramifications more widely. We will do this by
making three points.   
First, just as the flaw in the pro-poor growth strategies was perhaps
their undue neglect of equality and income distribution, inclusive
growth strategies should not lose sight of the importance of a
focused and systematic concern with poverty eradication. Since
interest in inclusive growth evolved largely out of earlier concerns
with pro-poor-growth strategies, there is always a risk that inclusive
growth may come to be seen as supplanting – rather than
supplementing – concerns with poverty and the imperative to
eradicate it. As we saw earlier in Section 3, emphasis on inclusive
growth as growth that ‘should benefit all’ – although a useful
reminder that growth should be broad-based – may also overlook
the fact that any serious bid to improve equality should start with a
concern to improve the lot of the poor as a matter of priority. To
reconcile inclusive growth with pro-poor growth, we need to take a
wider notion of the ‘poor’ by widening the base to embrace those
below the median income or somewhere in that region. As ADB
has aptly observed, inclusive growth should embrace “...the
continuation of pro-growth economic strategies – but with a much
sharper focus on ensuring that the economic opportunities created
by growth are available to all – particularly the poor – to the
maximum extent possible” (ADB, 2007: 13–14). This will ensure
that while the accent is on improving equity, the ‘poor’ will not be
lost sight of. This is particularly important in the MENA region
where, as we have seen, ‘poverty’ – narrowly defined by
international benchmarks – seems unduly low. 
A second point relates to the circumstances in which recent interest
in inclusive growth has emerged in the Middle East region and is
likely to evolve. Given that this interest is to a large extent rooted in
understanding the ‘shortcomings’ and ‘failures’ of the policies
associated with the ancien regimes, and a desire to avoid such
‘mistakes’ in the future, there is an expectation that achieving
inclusive growth can act as a ‘social  insurance’ mechanism to
attain stability and avert future upheavals and revolutions. There are
at least two problems with this perspective. On one hand, it ignores
the broader and wider (social and political) roots of discontent that
ran deep and wide in these societies by reducing them to economic
failures and shortcomings only. On the other hand, it is based on a
misreading of the relationship between economic and political
cycles. Not all social and political upheavals come against a
background of growing poverty and deprivation and MENA’s
experience is no exception to this.  Arguably, both recent Arab
uprisings as well as the Iranian Revolution in 1978/79 occurred
during or after periods of oil booms when major and sustained
spikes in oil revenues led to periods of growth and relative
prosperity for the countries affected.
A third and final caution relates to the continued ambiguity of the
concept of inclusive growth and its possible ramifications at policy
levels.  As we have seen there is as yet no universally agreed
definition of inclusive growth. Until consensus is achieved over how
precisely to define, measure and monitor inclusive growth, and
given its strong popular policy appeal in the current context, there
is a risk that inclusive growth will be seen as a vehicle for offering
‘everything for all’. If so, it risks providing a readymade justification
for adopting popular policies and, ultimately, acting as a short cut
to bringing back old style populism to the region. 
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Implications for the Bank
From an operational point of view this work has helped the Bank
better define how inclusive growth could be monitored in North
Africa. This will be instrumental for improving quality at entry and
in monitoring and evaluating the impact of the Bank towards the
achievement of its 10 years strategy.
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Appendix 
Table 1: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Rankings for Selective Indicators
(averaged for 2000-02)
Growth Health and Demographics Labour Force and Employment
GDP  
Growth 
GDP per 
capita
Growth 
Public
Health 
Expenditure
(% GDP)
Mortality
Rate, 
Under-5 
(per 1,000)
Life 
Expectancy
at Birth
Tuberculosis 
(per 100,000
people)
Wage & 
Salaried
(% of total
employment)  
Employment-
to-Population 
Ratios
(% of 15+)
Female 
Labour Force
(% of total
workforce)
North Africa
Algeria 102 104 93 109 101 101 66 172 179
Egypt 80 100 114 107 109 52 68 161 170
Libya 174 174 106 82 70 74 - 147 162
Morocco 66 62 157 117 110 114 93 151 163
Tunisia 88 81 85 85 68 49 58 163 165
Other Middle East
Iran 37 42 122 106 104 50 - 165 173
Israel 116 144 41 25 10 21 23 135 57
Jordan 46 77 43 83 75 18 40 169 178
Lebanon 114 125 79 61 93 36 - 162 168
Saudi Arabia 148 164 87 65 83 40 - 146 177
Syria 57 106 121 73 52 59 83 154 171
Turkey 130 136 77 94 105 65 85 150 161
Yemen 56 113 112 140 144 109 - 164 166
Other LDCs
China 12 13 142 93 85 106 - 22 72
Chile 96 94 72 40 30 51 57 134 148
Brazil 121 122 88 97 99 86 61 61 97
India 64 75 160 132 142 138 - 90 159
Indonesia 62 59 171 116 125 135 97 59 130
South Korea 24 18 105 17 39 96 62 76 103
Malaysia 50 79 137 38 73 103 49 66 140
Mexico 129 133 113 84 48 55 63 83 147
Russia 23 14 81 69 128 116 7 105 22
South Africa 90 114 78 124 161 183 - 167 88
Countries included 188 188 177 181 192 188 109 173 182
Missing Countries 5 5 16 12 1 5 84 20 11
Total Countries 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
A f r i c a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  B a n k
40
AfDB E c o n o m i c  B r i e f
2 0 1 3  •  w w w . a f d b . o r g
Table 1 Cont’d: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Rankings for Selective Indicators
(averaged for 2000-02)
Education
Ratio of Female to 
Male Secondary
Enrolment (%)
Sanitation
Population Using 
Improved Sanitation
Facilities (%)
Inequality
Gini Index
(2000-04)
Governance
Corruption
Perception
Index
Inclusive Growth
Index (IGi)(a) 
max = 100
min = 0
North Africa
Algeria 47 59 - - 24.1
Egypt 117 77 22 60 34.7
Libya 35 44 - - 29.4
Morocco 131 106 63 45 29.2
Tunisia 59 86 65 33 41.3
Other Middle East
Iran 115 64 - - 32.2
Israel 89 1 54 19 59.7
Jordan 54 37 52 39 39.7
Lebanon - 37 - - 35.2
Saudi Arabia - - - - 25.5
Syria 119 72 39 - 36.2
Turkey 135 77 75 56 31.7
Yemen 159 132 - - 16.7
Other LDCs
China 113 124 72 60 47.8
Chile 68 58 102 18 47.2
Brazil 21 97 111 47 41.1
India 139 147 - 70 25.2
Indonesia 103 130 11 90 27.4
South Korea 86 1 - 43 62.0
Malaysia 24 56 50 35 54.5
Mexico 57 95 91 56 41.6
Russia - 101 48 77 53.4
South Africa 23 96 108 36 30.1
Countries included 161 176 116 94 -
Missing Countries 32 17 77 - -
Total Countries 193 193 193 - -
Notes: (a) The overall inclusive scores for each country (IGi) are computed as a geometric mean for that country of the standardised values for different indicators (defined below) according
to the following formula:
(1)
where: 
(i = 1,… m:  country i included in the dataset); 
(j = 1,… n:  indicator j included in the dataset); and 
sji is a standardised score for the rankings obtained in respect of indicator j for country i. These standardised scores are obtained using the following formula (for each indicator for each
country):
(2)
where rj is a country’s rank in respect of indicator j in (descending order) and mj is  the total number of countries for which data for indicator sj is available. 
Source: WDI (2012) and Transparency International (2012) for the Corruption Perception Index. The following countries have been excluded from the World Bank’s ranking tables mainly for
data reasons: Eritrea; Seychelles; Somalia; Antigua and Barbuda; Cuba; Dominica; Grenada; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Bhutan; Iraq; North
Korea; Lebanon; Oman; Monaco; San Marino; Vatican City; Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Nauru; Palau; Samoa; Tuvalu; Vanuatu.
 
IGi  = . …  
sji = 100 . ( )i 
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Table 2: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Rankings for Selective Indicators
(averaged for 2008-10)
Growth Health and Demographics Labour Force and Employment
GDP  
Growth 
GDP per 
capita
Growth 
Public
Health 
Expenditure
(% GDP)
Mortality
Rate, 
Under-5 
(per 1,000)
Life 
Expectancy
at Birth
Tuberculosis 
(per 100,000
people)
Wage & 
Salaried
(% of total
employment)  
Employment-
to-Population 
Ratios
(% of 15+)
Female 
Labour Force
(% of total
workforce)
North Africa
Algeria 95 91 90 110 98 112 - 167 178
Egypt 38 37 145 99 96 49 - 153 169
Libya 91 100 127 80 67 82 - 140 161
Morocco 56 41 143 116 108 116 79 149 163
Tunisia 78 64 87 81 69 66 - 161 164
Other Middle East
Iran 110 104 128 103 101 51 75 165 175
Israel 83 90 57 24 8 16 20 123 49
Jordan 51 59 37 92 87 21 36 169 176
Lebanon 12 8 100 52 103 40 - 156 168
Saudi Arabia 88 115 123 53 79 46 - 146 182
Syria 60 63 151 73 54 53 67 166 179
Turkey 116 117 56 79 83 67 69 155 162
Yemen 49 75 156 145 142 94 - 158 167
Other LDCs
China 9 1 119 75 90 109 - 25 85
Chile 93 73 80 47 33 50 53 119 135
Brazil 69 49 77 82 95 86 62 52 95
India 19 16 168 133 140 145 - 111 166
Indonesia 39 25 167 114 122 149 85 65 134
South Korea 89 67 74 113 17 114 56 88 112
Malaysia 79 76 132 38 75 110 50 85 147
Mexico 139 143 105 78 43 58 63 86 145
Russia 131 110 91 59 124 122 4 91 22
South Africa 117 116 78 130 174 188 34 159 100
Countries included 182 182 176 181 192 190 89 173 183
Missing Countries 11 11 17 12 1 3 104 20 10
Total Countries 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
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Table 2: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Rankings for Selective Indicators
(averaged for 2008-10)
Education
Ratio of Female to 
Male Secondary
Enrolment (%)
Sanitation
Population Using 
Improved Sanitation
Facilities (%)
Inequality
Gini Index
(2000-04)
Governance
Corruption
Perception
Index
Inclusive Growth
Index (IGi)(a) 
max = 100
min = 0
North Africa
Algeria 66 56 - 103 29.6
Egypt 111 56 14 108 38.8
Libya - 48 - 134 37.6
Morocco - 106 55 85 31.6
Tunisia 33 83 60 62 42.4
Other Middle East
Iran 106 2 44 152 27.9
Israel 63 2 - 32 69.2
Jordan 38 41 30 49 42.6
Lebanon 13 - - 120 43.8
Saudi Arabia 123 - - 64 27.1
Syria 76 62 - 133 29.1
Turkey 125 74 51 58 36.3
Yemen 150 120 41 147 21.6
Other LDCs
China 37 111 64 76 56.5
Chile 53 51 86 23 50.2
Brazil - 93 92 75 45.0
India 126 138 21 85 28.8
Indonesia 82 119 25 116 31.6
South Korea 90 2 - 39 54.1
Malaysia 24 51 72 53 48.8
Mexico 26 85 79 86 40.8
Russia 105 104 59 149 42.9
South Africa 43 92 97 54 20.6
Countries included 155 170 98 179 -
Missing Countries 38 23 95 - -
Total Countries 193 193 193 - -
Notes: (a) The overall inclusive scores for each country (IGi) are computed as a geometric mean for that country of the standardised values for different indicators (defined below) according
to the following formula:
(1)
where: 
(i = 1,… m:  country i included in the dataset); 
(j = 1,… n:  indicator j included in the dataset); and 
sji is a standardised score for the rankings obtained in respect of indicator j for country i. These standardised scores are obtained using the following formula (for each indicator for each
country):
(2)
where rj is a country’s rank in respect of indicator j in (descending order) and mj is  the total number of countries for which data for indicator sj is available. 
Source: WDI (2012) and Transparency International (2012) for the Corruption Perception Index. The following countries have been excluded from the World Bank’s ranking tables mainly for
data reasons: Eritrea; Seychelles; Somalia; Antigua and Barbuda; Cuba; Dominica; Grenada; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Bhutan; Iraq; North
Korea; Lebanon; Oman; Monaco; San Marino; Vatican City; Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Nauru; Palau; Samoa; Tuvalu; Vanuatu.
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